The security market line (SML) accords with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by taking on an upward slope in pessimistic sentiment periods, but is downward sloping during optimistic periods. We hypothesize that this finding obtains because periods of optimism attract equity investment by unsophisticated, overconfident, traders in risky opportunities (high beta stocks), while such traders stay along the sidelines during pessimistic periods. Thus, high beta stocks become overpriced in optimistic periods, but during pessimistic periods, noise trading is reduced, so that traditional beta pricing prevails.
1 In financial markets, optimistic or pessimistic beliefs induced by sentiment should trigger unsophisticated ("noise") trading, as postulated by Black (1986) , and thus affect financial asset prices. However, there are reasons to believe that such trading will not be symmetric across optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods, but will be more prevalent during optimistic ones.
For example, as shown by Amromin and Sharpe (2009) , individual investors expect higher stock returns, and thus participate in equities more strongly, following good periods rather than following bad ones.
Similarly Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) find that unsophisticated investors are more likely to enter the stock market during prosperous periods. Taken together, these arguments suggest that unsophisticated trading will be more prevalent and impactful in optimistic periods. 2 We argue that the heightened noise trader activity in optimistic periods will not affect all companies equally, but will be disproportionately concentrated among high beta stocks. The general 1 For related work in experimental economics on the effect of sentiment on financial decisions see Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) and Andrade, Odean and Lin (2012) . 2 Furthermore, pessimistic investors need to engage in short selling to express their views and empirical evidence show that individual investors are generally reluctant to sell short (Barber and Odean, 2008) . This aversion to short selling can also contribute to decreased noise trading in pessimistic sentiment periods.
preference of individual investors toward high beta stocks has been documented by Barber and Odean (2000) , who show that the market beta of the aggregate retail investors' portfolio exceeds unity. Further, Barber and Odean (2001, Table III) show that this preference is particularly strong among unsophisticated retail investors (i.e., those who trade the most and earn the lowest returns--young, single males). These observations indicate that the enhanced unsophisticated trading during optimistic periods would be more prevalent in high beta stocks. Further, if unsophisticated traders are optimistic about the aggregate stock market but face leverage constraints or are simply averse to borrowing or shorting, high beta stocks are a natural vehicle for them to act on this optimism.
The above arguments can have implications regarding the validity of the CAPM. Specifically, if it is indeed the case that unsophisticated traders are active market participants during optimistic periods, and are attracted to high beta companies, they will overprice high beta stocks. If these investors, on the other hand, stay by the sidelines during pessimistic periods, then the behavior of financial markets may be more in line with neoclassical asset pricing theories, and beta will be positively related to returns. On the whole these effects can cancel out, flattening the unconditional beta-return relationship. We provide empirical support for the above arguments, by showing that the upward sloping security market line in pessimistic (but not optimistic) periods is also accompanied by lower levels of unsophisticated trading in high beta stocks during such periods.
In our base analysis, we use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) index (BW) to capture sentiment, which is orthogonalized with respect to a set of macro variables. Confirming Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012 , Tables 7 and 8) , 3 we find that for the period 1966 to 2010, using the Fama and French (1992) methodology, a standard beta, while unconditionally insignificant, is positively related to returns during pessimistic periods, while estimates of the market risk premium are reasonable and in line with intuition.
Consistent with our prediction, the nullification of the beta-return relation stems from optimistic periods, where beta is negatively related to returns.
Next, we conduct several tests to examine whether the negative pricing of beta in optimistic periods reflects an overpricing due to optimistic noise traders, who are attracted to high beta stocks. First, since mutual fund flows reflect active reallocation decisions of individual investors, we examine whether optimistic periods are associated with higher capital flows into equity mutual funds. Our results confirm this prediction.
We then examine whether unsophisticated (noise) trading rises disproportionately for higher beta stocks in optimistic periods, using different firm-level proxies for noise trading. Our first measure is the signed forecast error in sell-side analyst earnings forecasts. Since sell-side analysts exert a powerful impact on retail investor earnings expectations (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007) , their relative optimism about high beta stocks can be used to capture the bullishness of noise traders. Secondly, we use the Frazzini and Lamont (2008) flow-based measure that captures whether a specific stock is in abnormally high demand by mutual fund investors. Lastly, we use the probability of informed trading (the PIN measure of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara 2002) , as calculated in Brown and Hillegeist (2007) , which indicates whether the trading for a specific stock in a given month is likely to be driven by fundamental information. Our results across all three measures consistently show that noise traders are indeed relatively more bullish and active for high beta stocks when sentiment is optimistic, in line with our hypothesis.
Several studies show that small trades are likely to reflect the trading decisions of noise traders (Hvidkjaer, 2006; 2008; Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007) . Along these lines, we use intra-day transactions data to estimate stock-by-stock small trader order imbalances (SOIB), and test whether they indicate more bullishness about high beta stocks in periods of optimism. We find that in optimistic periods small investors are net buyers (sellers) of high (low) beta stocks, whereas no pattern is observed in pessimistic periods. Moreover, when examining SOIB around earnings announcements and analyst forecasts, we find that small investors are relatively more bullish (or less bearish) about high beta stocks when sentiment is optimistic. The SOIB's from pessimistic periods in response to these events show little variation across beta portfolios, which suggests that in these periods rational investors largely anticipate these announcements. Overall these results provide further support to our hypothesis.
Since our argument is that increased noise trading in optimistic sentiment periods leads to the underperformance of high beta stocks, by augmenting the BW sentiment index to include information from our proxies of noise trading, we should be better able to capture periods in which high beta stocks are overpriced. To test this notion we perform principal component analysis using the BW sentiment index and our proxies for noise trading, and define sentiment using the first principal component from this procedure. We find that the augmented index is a more powerful predictor of the underperformance of high beta stocks in optimistic periods compared to the original BW index, whereas both indices perform similarly in pessimistic periods. This finding supports our hypothesis that heightened noise trading activity leads to negative beta pricing in optimistic sentiment periods.
Finally, we conduct several double portfolio sorts, to examine whether the beta-return relation we document reflects (or relates to) broader facets of firm risk. Specifically, we consider institutional ownership (higher institutional ownership implies lower agency risk, viz. Gillian and Starks, 2000) , analyst coverage (high coverage stocks have lower information quality risk in the sense of Arbel and Strebel, 1983) , and short ratio (stocks with a higher proportion of shares held short in relation to total shares outstanding are most likely cheaper to short sell and thus involve less noise trader risk, viz. Shleifer and Summers, 1990) . Our results indicate that positive beta pricing in pessimistic periods is preserved in all tables, which suggests that it reflects pricing of covariance risk. Conversely, the negative pricing of beta in optimistic periods, is stronger among stocks with lower analyst coverage and stocks which are more expensive to sell short, which, suggests that the negative pricing of beta in optimistic periods arises from investors' behavioral biases and limits to arbitrage.
Our results hold when we account for the predictability of market returns from sentiment, if we measure sentiment using the Consumer Confidence Index compiled by the University of Michigan, to different beta specifications, to controls for additional variables and to previous determinants of a timevarying security market line (SML). We discuss these robustness tests in later sections of the paper.
Of course, there is always the possibility that the Baker and Wurgler (2006) measure of sentiment captures a state variable related to macroeconomic risk, and that beta and its pricing dynamically vary with this state variable. While this possibility cannot completely be ruled out, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that variation in conditional betas would need to be implausibly large to explain asset pricing anomalies. 4 Further, in our context, a rational argument would also need to explain why a traditional beta is negatively priced during optimistic periods, which seems like a daunting task. Finally, as we mention in Section 7 to follow, we find that our results continue to hold when we use betas conditional on sentiment. Thus, we believe that, if rational channels play a role in our findings, it is likely that they do so in conjunction with behavioral channels.
In other related work, Yu and Yuan (2011) report that the positive relationship between aggregate market volatility and market returns only exists in pessimistic periods. In independent work, Shen and Yu (2012) argue that stocks with high exposure to macroeconomic shocks carry a positive premium in pessimistic periods (see also Jouini and Napp (2011)). Investor sentiment has been linked to various cross sectional predictors of stock returns (Livnat and Petrovic, 2008; Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam, 2013; Cen, Lu and Yang, 2013; Stambaugh, et al., 2012) . Thus, existing literature has linked sentiment to both the rational risk-return tradeoff and anomalies left unexplained by rational pricing models.
Our results add to the growing literature on how sentiment affects equity prices and influences thinking on the behavioral versus neoclassical finance debate. Since the seminal result of Fama and French (1992) that the empirical return-beta relation is flat, 5 various explanations have been put forward for why beta is not priced, such as the inefficiency of market proxies (Roll and Ross, 1994) , the inability of standard unconditional tests to properly measure systematic risk (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) , delegated portfolio management (Karceski, 2002; Brennan, Cheng, and Li, 2012) , 4 Specifically, Lewellen and Nagel (2006) show that if a conditional CAPM holds, a stock's alpha depends primarily on the covariance between beta and the market risk premium, which is bounded above by the product of the standard deviations of beta and the premium. The empirical standard deviations are not nearly high enough to explain the alphas achieved from predictor variables corresponding to common asset pricing anomalies. 5 Early investigations of the relation between average returns and covariance risk met with mixed results; see, for example, Douglas (1969), Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) , Fama and MacBeth (1973) , and Haugen and Heins (1975) .
market frictions (Black, 1972; Baker, Bradley and Wurgler, 2011; Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) and the omission of state variables (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Campbell et al., 2012) .
Other literature has also produced evidence that the slope of the SML is time varying. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) advance an argument based on money illusion, and show that riskier stocks earn higher returns when expected inflation is low. Similarly, Hong and Sraer (2012) propose that the underperformance of risky stocks relates to aggregate disagreement about the market factor and limits to arbitrage, and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) show that in periods of tighter borrowing constraints the security market line is flatter. In our analysis we find that, whilst controlling for these predictors of the SML's slope, investor sentiment influences the beta-return relation, in line with the notion of noise trading, as advanced by Black (1986) .
Hypotheses
Our hypotheses are based on the dual premises that pessimistic periods consist of rational investors and optimistic periods attract unsophisticated investors. We thus propose that capital market equilibria are different across optimistic and pessimistic periods.
The studies cited in the introduction (Amromin and Sharpe, 2009; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Lamont and Thaler, 2003) all suggest that individual investors may be more prone to investing in risky assets during optimistic periods. We thus propose that unsophisticated investors stay by the sidelines during pessimistic periods, so that these periods consist of utility-maximizing risk averse agents. This implies that a standard CAPM holds during these periods.
We propose periods of optimism attract unsophisticated agents who hold unduly optimistic beliefs about market returns. We argue that these agents exploit their signal only in high beta stocks. We motivate this assumption as follows. Barber and Odean (2000) show that the typical retail investor's portfolio is tilted toward higher beta stocks (they document a loading of 1.1 of the aggregate retail investor portfolio on the market factor). Further, Barber and Odean (2001) show that the most unsophisticated investors (young, single males, who lose the most from investing, and are the most susceptible to overconfidence), also prefer to be long on riskier (higher beta) stocks. We note that if optimistic investors are averse to shorting or borrowing, they would prefer to buy stocks with high exposure to the market, as these promise higher perceived benefits from trading.
Under the condition that the optimism of unsophisticated traders is expressed primarily in high beta stocks, such stocks will become overvalued during optimistic periods. Hypotheses H1 and H2 above form the bases for our empirical analyses. First, we investigate whether high beta stocks have lower returns in optimistic periods, and higher returns in pessimistic periods. Second, we examine whether noise traders are more bullish for high beta stocks in optimistic periods.
Data and Methodology

Sentiment Index
We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) . This index is constructed using six proxies of investors' propensity to invest in stocks: trading volume (total NYSE turnover), the premium for dividend paying stocks, the closed-end fund discount, the number and firstday returns of IPOs, and the equity share in new issues. To remove the effect of economic fundamentals from these variables, Baker and Wurgler (2006) regress each of them on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable consumption, non-durable consumption, services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the first principal component of the residuals from the regressions as the Sentiment Index. 7, 8 We define all observations in year t as optimistic 6 Simple analytical frameworks demonstrating these points are available upon request. We thank the Associate Editor for suggesting another mechanism: Unsophisticated investors may be overconfident about a (valid) positive market signal during optimistic periods, and overinvest in high beta stocks, as leverage constraints might preclude a large investment in the market index. This phenomenon would also lead to overvaluation of high beta stocks. 7 We thank Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler for making the Sentiment Index publicly available.
(pessimistic) if the Sentiment Index is positive (negative) in year t-1 (Yu and Yuan, 2011) . The index is available from 1965 to 2010, so our sample covers the period 1966-2010.
Asset pricing regressions
In our empirical tests we use all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ for which we have available data for each of the ensuing tests. Prices, returns, and shares outstanding are from the CRSP monthly files, while book values of equity are obtained from Compustat (as in Fama and French, 1992) .
We start by estimating beta following the methodology of Fama and French (1992) . Specifically, in June of year t, all NYSE firms are sorted by size (price x shares outstanding) to determine decile breakpoints. Using these breakpoints, we assign all firms in the sample in year t to 10 size portfolios. To allow for variation in beta that is unrelated to size, we further subdivide each size decile into 10 portfolios sorted on pre-ranking betas for individual stocks. These pre-ranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. We set beta breakpoints for each size decile using only NYSE stocks. This procedure yields 100 size-beta portfolios.
After assigning firms into size-beta portfolios in June, we obtain the equally-weighted returns of these portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1. This yields 100 time series of returns, one for each size-beta portfolio, spanning our entire sample period. We estimate post-formation betas using the returns of these portfolios and the CRSP value-weighted return as a proxy for the market portfolio. As in Fama and French (1992) , pre-and post-ranking betas are calculated as the sum of the slopes in the regression of returns on the current and lagged market return. These betas are then assigned back to individual stocks, depending on their size-beta classification. To make sure that all the information used to explain returns is known ex ante, we mainly focus on rolling betas using five years of data prior to the holding period in month t. However, we present results using the full sample betas in Section 6.2 to 8 In recent and independent work, Sibley, Xing, and Zhang (2012) show that the Baker and Wurgler index correlates with contemporaneous business cycle variables, but they do not rule out the possibility that these variables may also capture sentiment. They also show that including the sentiment variable reduces pricing errors for 25 size and book/market-sorted portfolios relative to the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model. Unlike us, they do not focus on cross-sectional beta pricing across individual stocks.
follow.
Our main analysis employs the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. Thus, in each month t we run a cross-sectional regression of returns on post-formation betas and control variables. The time series average of the regression coefficients and its standard error provide standard tests of whether these variables are on average priced in the cross-section of stock returns. In the cross-sectional regressions, we control for firm size (Banz, 1981) , the book/market ratio of equity (Statman, 1980) , the return of stock i in month t-1 (Jegadeesh, 1990) , the cumulative return of stock i in the six months prior to month t-1 (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) , and the cumulative return of stock i in the six months prior to month t-7
(Novy-Marx, 2012). Table 1 shows the time series averages of the post-formation rolling betas for each size-beta portfolio, with three important findings emerging. First, post-ranking betas precisely reproduce the ranking of preranking betas, second, there is sizable variation in betas that is unrelated to firm size, and third, betas are generally larger for smaller companies. Table 2 shows some key characteristics of the beta-sorted portfolios. High-beta stocks tend to be smaller stocks with lower B/M ratios and return on assets, as well as higher total volatility and dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts (i.e., analyst disagreement). These results are consistent with the notion that high-beta stocks tend to be riskier companies with more speculative cash flows. Table 3 indicates that the correlation between the rolling and full sample betas exceeds 80%. Overall, the correlations are quite modest suggesting that multicollinearity is not likely a material issue in our statistical tests.
Summary statistics
Portfolio Results
We begin with a simple portfolio test. We rank stocks based on their pre-formation betas in deciles (using NYSE breakpoints) in June of year t and hold these portfolios for 12 months. We calculate their returns in each month t on a value-weighted basis. The time series averages of the monthly value-weighted returns for the beta portfolios are presented in Table 4 . To label periods as optimistic or pessimistic, we follow the procedure outlined in the previous section, and average these monthly returns separately for optimistic and pessimistic months.
The first row of Table 4 presents unconditional results for our entire sample period. The results corroborate the findings of Fama and French (1992) , who report that the relationship between beta and returns is flat. The difference in average monthly returns between the extreme beta deciles is a trivial -0.01% and is not statistically significant. The second row of Table 4 presents the average monthly return of these portfolios in pessimistic sentiment months and indicates that stock returns increase with beta, as predicted by the CAPM. The average monthly return of the low-beta portfolio is 0.79% and is 1.88% in the high-beta portfolio. This is a return spread of more than 12% per year. A t-test for whether the return of the high-beta portfolio is greater than that of the low-beta portfolio, as predicted by theory, produces a p-value smaller than 5%. Figure 1 shows a graphical illustration of this result by demonstrating the upward-sloping nature of the empirical SML during pessimistic periods.
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The third row in Table 4 shows the average monthly returns of the beta portfolios in optimistic sentiment periods. In these periods low-beta stocks outperform high-beta stocks. According to our hypothesis this occurs because noise traders overprice high beta stocks when they are optimistic. We conduct several tests to directly test this proposition in Section 5.
Regression Analysis
The results in the previous section are indicative of a positive relationship between beta and stock returns in pessimistic periods. In this section, we provide more direct evidence using the regression approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) . As discussed earlier, we also control for various other characteristics that have been shown to affect returns. line with previous research. Specifically, we find that beta is not priced in the cross-section of stocks, and that there is a significant size and value effect in the data. In addition, there is a strong monthly reversal effect, as well as a medium-horizon momentum effect and a 'delayed' continuation effect. These effects are all consistent with the original papers documenting the relevant phenomena: Jegadeesh (1990), Fama and French (1992) , Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , and Novy-Marx (2012). Our findings provide confirmation of the original results in our extended sample spanning several more years than the former three studies.
In Panels B and C of Table 5 we observe sentiment-conditional patterns in the size and momentum effects. The size effect is present only in pessimistic periods (Baker and Wurgler, 2006) , while the momentum effect is present only in optimistic periods (Antoniou, et al., 2013) . The value effect is present in both types of sentiment periods, but the regression coefficient is smaller in pessimistic periods than in optimistic ones. Why the value effect prevails in both optimistic and pessimistic periods needs further analysis in future research. One potential explanation is that book/market captures a missing element of risk (e.g., Berk, 1995; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Petkova and Zhang, 2005; Campbell et al., 2012) that is priced in both optimistic and pessimistic periods. 10 The monthly reversal and the delayed continuation effects are present in both optimistic and pessimistic periods, and the coefficients in both periods are quite similar for the variables capturing these effects.
Panel B of Table 5 shows that in pessimistic periods, beta is strongly positively related to returns, even in the presence of the various control variables. These variables reduce the size and significance of the coefficient on beta (especially the firm size variable), but beta is always positive and significant, with a t-statistic of at least 2.42. 11 Although the implied market premium is quite high when beta is the only variable, it is brought down to 0.8%-0.9% per month when control variables are included in the crosssectional regression. While still higher than the 8.0%-8.5% annual premium documented in various sources (e.g., Allen, Brealey, and Myers, 2010), this premium nonetheless is reasonable in terms of its magnitude.
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In untabulated analysis we regress the time series coefficients on beta on a constant and the level of sentiment in the previous year. We obtain a coefficient on sentiment equal to -0.52 with a Newey and West (1987)-corrected t-statistic equal to -2.42, which shows that our result continues to hold when we define sentiment as a continuous variable.
Panel C of Table 5 indicates that beta is negatively related to returns during optimistic periods.
We argue using formal tests in Section 5 that this is because during optimistic periods risky stocks become overpriced and subsequently underperform. 13 A t-test for the difference between the two coefficients on beta across Panels B and C safely rejects the hypothesis that they are equal. 14, 15 We conduct several additional tests to establish the significance of this differential, which are available from the authors upon request.
We would like to stress, however, an issue that is common to papers that use the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Specifically, the sentiment index is a principal component extracted from 11 In additional analysis, we replicate the above regressions controlling for liquidity using the Amihud (2002) measure [calculated using Equation (1) in Brennan, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2013) ]. To address issues arising from different calculations of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ volume, we add two Amihud measures in the regressions, IlliqNYAM (IlliqNas), which takes the value implied by this equation if the company is listed on NYSE or AMEX (NASDAQ), and 0 otherwise. Because NASDAQ volume is not available prior to 1982, these tests are based on a smaller sample; however, the results are virtually unchanged. 12 A risk premium of 8.5% is well within the one standard deviation band of our pessimistic period coefficient including all controls. Note that the standard deviation of the risk premium we obtain is comparable to those reported in Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992) . 13 Preliminary results are supportive, however, as we find that stocks in the optimistic period high-beta portfolio outperform stocks in the low-beta portfolio in the period t-13 to t-36 by 62% (t-statistic = 5.77), where t is the portfolio formation month (recall that optimism is defined based on the sentiment index in the past year). The corresponding figure in pessimistic periods is 10% (t-statistic = 1.29). 14 The medians of the betas in optimistic and pessimistic periods are also significantly different. 15 Fama and MacBeth (1973) find evidence that support the CAPM for the pre-1970 period. In unreported analysis we use the sentiment index provided by Baker and Wurgler that is available from 1934 (SENT^(old)), and perform the tests in Table 5 conditional on sentiment for the period 1934-1965. Qualitatively we obtain similar findings in relation to the pricing of beta as those in Table 5. several time series, and as such, requires full sample information for construction. This implies that our approach is not amenable to estimation in real time. It would be valuable for researchers and practitioners if future research were to identify an alternative sentiment proxy based only on historical information.
Sentiment, Beta, and Noise Trading
While our baseline results show that high-beta stocks earn higher average returns than low-beta stocks in pessimistic periods, the reverse happens in optimistic periods. According to our arguments, this occurs because in optimistic periods noise traders are more bullish for high-beta stocks. This leads to an overpricing of these stocks in optimistic periods, and therefore lower subsequent returns. In this section we test this conjecture using several proxies that capture noise trader activity.
Our starting point is the notion that for (presumably unsophisticated) retail investors, the principal avenue for broad-based stock market participation is through mutual funds. 16 This implies that fund flows can be used as a proxy for retail investor optimism, a point also made by earlier studies (Teo and Woo, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Frazzini and Lamont, 2008) . In untabulated analysis, we estimate aggregate monthly fund flows (AFLOW) using the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and following the procedure in Akbas et al. (2014, Eq. (3) , p. 11). 17 The results indicate that AFLOW is 0.61% in optimistic months versus 0.39% in pessimistic months, and that the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. In dollar terms, mutual funds experience an average increase in inflows of $22 billion during optimistic months relative to pessimistic ones. This analysis corroborates the view that there is increased noise trader activity in optimistic periods.
We continue with tests that examine more directly whether noise traders are particularly bullish about high beta stocks in periods of optimistic sentiment. Our first, and relatively direct, indicator, is a measure of optimism in earnings expectations, measured by analysts' signed earnings forecast errors. 16 The Investment Company Institute estimates that 44% of U.S. households owned mutual funds in 2011, and that as a group households owned 89% of the mutual fund industry (2012 Investment Company Fact Book) . 17 The equation is , where TNA is the total net assets of fund i in month t and MRET is the return of fund i in month t.
earnings forecasts for uncertain stocks when sentiment is high. Given that analyst forecasts likely impact retail investor expectations, "sentimental" analysts may also contribute to increased noise trading among high-beta stocks in optimistic periods. 18 Using the IBES summary files for one-year ahead forecasts we calculate average forecast error (FE) for every firm in June of year t (defined as (mean forecastactual)/abs(actual)) and then take the average in the high-and low-beta portfolios conditional on sentiment.
Higher FE values indicate increased noise trading.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table 6 . FE is generally higher for high beta stocks. This is expected, since analyst bias is likely to be stronger in situations when uncertainty is higher. However, and consistent with the analysis of Hribar and McInnis (2012) , we find that the relative increase in FE is much more pronounced in optimistic sentiment periods (0.11: t-stat 4.46). Moreover, we find that in optimistic periods FE reduces for low beta stocks and increases for high beta stocks, and that these differentials are statistically significant. This indicates higher relative noise trading among high beta stocks when sentiment is optimistic.
Our next set of proxies capture the bullishness of noise traders toward high beta stocks through their trading decisions. Frazzini and Lamont (2008) argue that stocks that are held by funds with a high positive difference between actual and hypothetical flows can be thought of as being in demand among noise traders, and are therefore overpriced. We thus compare actual with hypothetical flows into fund i in quarter t, where hypothetical flows are recursively proportional to fund i's TNA relative to the entire mutual fund industry from three years ago. Stocks that are held by funds with a high positive difference between actual and hypothetical flows (we label this difference FLOW) can be thought to be in demand among noise traders, and are therefore overpriced. 19 Using Equations (1)- (8) in Frazzini and Lamont (2008) , we calculate FLOW for each company every June of year t, and then take the average in the high 18 Note that excessively pessimistic forecasts are not likely to trigger noise trading because they are likely to be uncommon, given the career concerns faced by sell-side analysts, viz. Hong and Kubik 2003) . 19 To make these calculations, we use both the CRSP Mutual Funds Database and the CDA/Spectrum database provided by Thomson Financial. For more details about this methodology, see Frazzini and Lamont (2008 From Panel C of Table 6 , we find that in optimistic sentiment periods FLOW is negative for low beta stocks and positive for high beta stocks, and the difference is statistically significant (0.33: t-stat 4.05). This result shows that high beta stocks are relatively favored by noise traders during optimistic sentiment periods. 20 FLOW is higher for high beta stocks in pessimistic sentiment periods as well, but the difference is not statistically significant (0.12: t-stat 1.48). Moreover, the spread in FLOW between high and low beta stocks is significantly higher in optimistic sentiment periods (0.21: t-stat 1.90).
Our last indicator in this section of the analysis is the probability of informed trading (PIN), calculated in Brown and Hillegeist (2007) . 21 PIN is estimated from a structural model using intra-day order flow data and indicates whether the trading for a specific stock in a given month is likely to be driven by fundamental information. Every firm in June of year t is assigned a PIN value, which we then average in the high-and low-beta portfolios conditional on sentiment. Lower PIN values indicate increased noise trading.
From Panel D we observe that PIN is generally higher for low beta stocks, which conforms to the notion that trading is likely to be more informed if fundamentals are more transparent. However, we again observe that the relative spread in PIN between high and low beta stocks is significantly higher when sentiment is optimistic (-0.017: t-stat -2.81). Moreover, and similarly with Panel C, we find that in optimistic periods PIN increases for low beta stocks and decreases for high beta stocks, which supports the notion that noise trading among high beta stocks is relatively higher in optimistic sentiment periods.
Previous research shows that small trades are likely to reflect the decisions of unsophisticated 20 The economic mechanism for this result is explained in Barberis and Shleifer (2003) : during prosperous periods, high-beta stocks tend to do well, so noise traders flock into this "style" making it overpriced; therefore, the style subsequently underperforms. For evidence on return-chasing flows, see Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) , and Teo and Woo (2004) . 21 We thank Stephen Brown and Stephen Hillegeist for making their data publicly available (http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/sbrown/pinsdata.html).
traders (see for example, Hvidkjaer, 2006 Hvidkjaer, , 2008 and Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007) . In this section, we use intra-day transaction level data from the transaction and quotes database (TAQ) to calculate small investor net order imbalance (SOIB), expecting to observe more bullishness for high beta stocks in periods of optimism. To calculate order flow proxies for small investors we follow the procedure in Hvidkjaer (2006) .
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The results are shown in Table 7 . In Panel A we calculate average daily SOIB for each firmmonth, and then report the rolling monthly average of high and low beta stocks ending in June of year t.
Observations are divided into optimistic (pessimistic) depending on whether the BW sentiment index is positive (negative) in that year [this procedure is used for all analyses in Table 7 ]. We find that, in periods of optimism, small investors are net buyers of high beta stocks and net sellers of low beta stocks (0.009
vs. -0.005, with the spread significant at the 10% level). No spread is observed between high and low beta stocks in pessimistic periods. Moreover, when comparing the response of small investors toward high beta stocks across sentiment periods, we find that small investors become net sellers in pessimistic periods (-0.021), with the spread being statistically significant (0.03: t-stat -4.77). These results support the notion that noise traders are attracted to high beta stocks in periods of optimism.
In Panels B-D we examine the response of small investors to earnings announcements, revisions to analyst recommendations, and earnings forecasts. For earnings announcements we follow Livnat and
Mendenhall (2006) and calculate quarterly surprises using the seasonal random walk model. We assign each event-firm in a beta portfolio using the beta classifications obtained in June of year t and rank firms within each beta group in 4 standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) groups in each fiscal period. We average daily small investor SOIB in the window [-1,0] , where 0 is the announcement date, reporting results for the low (SUE=1) and high (SUE=4) earnings surprise group. In Panels C and D we use annual analyst earnings forecast revisions and revisions to analyst recommendations, which we classify into 22 The method involves using stocks size-based quintiles and computing the 99th stock price percentile. Gao, Yu, and Yuan (2012) show this effect to be concentrated in optimistic sentiment periods, and suggest that it reflects an overpricing due to noise trading activity.
The regression results with disagreement (Disp) and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) are shown in Table 5 , we average the coefficients on the different variables for the whole sample (Panel A), and separately for the Pessimistic (Panel B) and Optimistic (Panel C) sentiment periods. Model 1 refers to a regression that includes the variables used in Table 5 for this slightly shorter sample and Model 2 is the expanded version for this same sample, which also includes disagreement and idiosyncratic volatility.
In Model 2 in Panel A of Table 8 , we confirm DMS and AHXZ in that both Disp and IVOL are unconditionally negatively related to returns. In addition, once we partition on sentiment, this effect is concentrated in optimistic sentiment periods, consistent with the findings of Gao, Yu, and Yuan (2012) .
Comparing Models 1 and 2 in Panel C, the inclusion of these variables reduces the coefficient on beta in optimistic periods from -0.66% to -0.53% and its t-statistic from -2.03 to -1.68, which suggests that both the aforementioned channels contribute to the negative pricing of beta in optimistic periods. As shown by Panel B the beta-return relationship in pessimistic periods, is not affected, which suggests that in those periods prices are set according to fundamentals.
Next, we test the notion that an augmented sentiment index using information from noise trading proxies can better predict the underperformance of high beta stocks in optimistic periods. We use the monthly sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2007) orthogonalized to macroeconomic variables in month t, and the average Stock Specific Flow, FE and SOIB for high beta stocks (defined as in Tables 6 and 7b respectively) in the same month, perform principal component analysis, and retain the first principal component as an augmented sentiment index. 23 We average this augmented index for the months t-1 to t-7, and if this rolling average is positive (negative) we define sentiment in month t as optimistic (pessimistic). Using this index we repeat our baseline analysis in Tables 4 and 5 . The time period for this test is shorter, due to the fact that the noise trading proxies are not available for the earlier part of the sample. 23 The correlation between this first principal component and the original sentiment index is 79%.
The results are shown in Table 9 . Indeed we find that the augmented sentiment index is better able to predict the negative pricing of beta in optimistic sentiment periods. From Panel A, in a portfolio setting, we observe that the return spread between high and low beta stocks is -2.27% per month, considerably larger than the -1.16% shown in Table 4 . However, the spread in pessimistic periods is not materially altered. In Panel B, in a Fama-MacBeth setting, we observe that the coefficient of beta in optimistic sentiment periods with the augmented sentiment index is -1.27 (t-stat -3.04). When we repeat this analysis for the same time period using the original Baker and Wurgler (2007) Table 9 Panel B. This finding confirms that expanding the sentiment index to include information from the noise trading proxies improves the capacity of the index to identify optimistic sentiment, and therefore predict the negative pricing of beta in optimistic periods. The fact that the noise trading proxies do little to the predictability of returns from beta in pessimistic sentiment periods suggests that in those periods noise trading is less impactful and prices are set according to fundamentals. 
Beta-sorted Portfolios Cut Different Ways
In this section, we examine whether our central result is robust to firm characteristics that potentially capture dimensions of risk other than beta. Our aim is to ascertain if beta pricing might be proxying for some other risk source. Specifically, we consider institutional ownership (higher institutional ownership firms can be thought to involve lower agency risk as institutions effectively monitor the CEO-viz. Gillian and Starks, 2000) , analyst coverage (high coverage stocks have lower information quality risk in the sense of Arbel and Strebel, 1983) , and short ratio (stocks with a higher proportion of shares held short in relation to total shares outstanding are most likely cheaper to short sell and thus involve less noise 24 In unreported analysis we use the augmented sentiment index to replicate the analysis of Table 8 and Table 11 , and obtain very similar results as those in Table 9 . These results are available from the authors on request.
trader risk-viz. Shleifer and Summers, 1990) . We subdivide our sample into two groups using these variables (High vs. Low, cutting at the median within each beta portfolio every June of year t), and perform the portfolio analysis shown in Table 4 separately for each group. If beta pricing is proxying for a missing risk characteristic, it should be less evident across high-and low-beta stocks within the high-risk group (i.e., the low ownership, low coverage, and low short ratio groups).
The results of the portfolio analysis are shown in Table 10 . Our main result of positive beta pricing in pessimistic periods is preserved in all tables. Conversely, the result in optimistic periods, that lower beta stocks outperform higher beta stocks, is much less stable and seems to be stronger among higher uncertainty stocks, and stocks which are generally costlier to arbitrage. For example, as seen in Panels B2 and C2, the underperformance of high-beta stocks is only observed among stocks with low analyst coverage and those with low short ratio. 
Other Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct a final set of tests to ascertain robustness of our results. First, we conduct the Fama-MacBeth regressions from Table 8 (model 2) while controlling for additional variables shown in Baker and Wurgler (2006) to affect stock returns conditional on sentiment. Specifically we include firm age (AGE), external finance (EF), growth in sales (GS), and profitability and dividend paying dummies (PrD, DivD, respectively). We define these variables following Baker and Wurgler (2006) .
The results are shown in Table 11 . For brevity we only report findings for pessimistic (Panel A) and optimistic (Panel B) sentiment periods. We find that in pessimistic periods beta continues to be positive and significant (0.67: t-stat 2.34), whereas in optimistic periods it is negative but insignificant (-0.53; -1.49). In terms of the additional variables included in the regressions the results show that some have explanatory power, in line with the results in Baker and Wurgler (2006) , i.e., returns in optimistic periods reduce with firm age and external finance, and returns in pessimistic periods are lower for dividend paying stocks. Overall the results confirm that our findings are robust when controlling for a comprehensive set of thirteen variables.
One issue is whether our differential results for beta pricing during optimistic and pessimistic periods obtain because of variation in beta conditional on sentiment. To address this, we estimate conditional betas using the technique of Jagannathan and Wang (1996) , using the BW sentiment index as the conditioning variable. The analysis indicates that these conditional betas are also positively priced in pessimistic periods and negatively priced during optimistic periods. The results are not reported here for brevity but are available upon request.
A concern with the rolling beta approach used in the main tests is that, due to the cyclicality of sentiment, returns from past optimist periods are used to estimate betas, which are then related to returns in pessimistic periods. It is possible, therefore, that betas may in fact encapsulate to some extent the effects of past noise trading, and may not reflect pure systematic variation. In this section we perform two tests to alleviate this concern. First, we use the methodology of Fama and French (1992) and calculate full sample betas, which we assign to individual stocks. Arguably, the full sample betas will be less affected by the noise trading since they are estimated in the full sample from both optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods. Second, we use the same rolling beta approach but in the regressions to estimate pre and post-formation betas we include aggregate fund flows (as per Footnote 17). Since, as argued earlier, fund flows likely reflect the decisions of noise traders, this will reduce the effect of noise trading on the measurement of beta.
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The results are shown in Table 12 . Both the full sample (Panel 1) and aggregate fund flow method (Panel 2) produce results consistent with those in the previous section. Beta is insignificant in the full sample but positive and significant in pessimistic periods. This suggests that our baseline result in pessimistic periods does not reflect the effect of past noise trading on beta.
We now consider whether our findings are robust to different specifications of investor sentiment.
Specifically we replicate the Fama-MacBeth regressions of As shown by Table 12 Panel 3, our main findings are robust to this alternative sentiment specification. When we average the coefficients of beta for the entire sample period, the relationship between beta and returns is flat. Once we partition on sentiment, however, we continue to observe that beta is positive and significant in pessimistic sentiment months and that the flat beta-return relationship (Panel A) is driven by investor sentiment in optimistic periods.
Because residual sentiment is estimated in a first stage regression, the analysis may contain a generated regressors problem. To control for this possibility we repeat the analysis using the raw Michigan index. We calculate the rolling average of the index from t-1 to t-7 and define the observation at time t as optimistic (pessimistic) if this rolling average is above (below) the sample median. The results are shown in Panel 4, and are in line with our baseline findings.
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We next examine whether sentiment predicts the beta-return relationship once we control for other factors that predict the slope of the security market line identified by other work, namely inflation (Cohen et al., 2005) , funding constraints (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) and aggregate disagreement 27 For more information about the index, visit http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/main.php. 28 In unreported analysis we conduct an additional test to control for the generated regressors problem: we define sentiment using a 10 year rolling average, using the annual Baker-Wurgler index that is unadjusted with respect to macroeconomic variables, and repeat the analysis in Table 5 . We obtain similar results as those in the paper. These results are available from the authors on request. (Hong and Sraer, 2012) . For this test we define sentiment using the monthly BW sentiment 29 index orthogonal to macroeconomic variables, which we further orthogonalize with respect to the inflation rate, two variables that capture leverage constraints (the TED spread, defined as the 3-month rate difference between LIBOR and the T-Bill rate and the BAB factor from Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) , 30 and two variables that capture aggregate disagreement (beta-weighted disagreement from analyst earnings forecasts as in Hong and Sraer, 2012 , and disagreement about market returns calculated using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as in Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens, 2009) . 31 We use the two different measures of disagreement to capture the potential influence of disagreement more robustly.
Also, it is well known that sell-side analysts have incentives to promote the firms they follow (Jackson, 2005) , and our SPF-based measure, since it is generated from forecasts about the aggregate economy, is arguably less contaminated by such incentives.
When we regress sentiment on these variables we find that the coefficient on inflation is negative and insignificant, the coefficients on TED and BAB are positive and significant, the coefficient on disagreement from sell-side analysts is positive and significant and the coefficient on disagreement from SPF data is negative and significant. 32 We define optimistic and pessimistic sentiment averaging the residuals from this regression, as in Panels 3 and 4 of 32 The opposing coefficients are interesting and deserve attention in future research. We do not try to investigate this further here since it is beyond the scope of our paper. 33 In unreported analysis, which is available on request, we orthogonalize the monthly sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2007) with respect to the first and second principal component derived from the full set of variables used
Finally we examine whether our results are driven by the predictability of aggregate market returns from sentiment. To do this we perform two tests: Firstly, in a time series framework, we regress the spread between the high and low beta portfolios from Table 4 on excess market returns, separately in the two sentiment periods. If our hypothesis is correct we should observe that the intercept in this regression is insignificant in pessimistic periods, indicating that the CAPM holds, and negative and significant in optimistic periods, indicating that the CAPM does not hold.
Secondly, in a cross sectional framework, we regress returns on an intercept and an interaction between beta and market returns, and report the time series averages of the coefficients on this term. Let r t+k denote the expected return at time t over a k period horizon, with the superscript m denoting the market. Further, let β t denote the beta vector at time t. With this specification, the slope obtained from the Fama-MacBeth procedure is: = Therefore, if the CAPM holds and returns are only proportional to betas ( ), the intercept should equal to 0 and the slope, which is now unrelated to sentiment, should equal 1. We expect this pattern to emerge in pessimistic periods but not optimistic ones.
The results from these tests are shown in Table 13 and support our hypothesis. In the time series test in Panel A we find that alpha is insignificant in pessimistic periods whereas it is negative and highly significant in optimistic periods. Similarly, in the cross sectional test in Panel B, we find that in pessimistic periods the intercept is 0 and the slope is indistinguishable from 1, whereas this is not the case in optimistic periods. Overall these results suggest that the evidence of stronger CAPM pricing in pessimistic periods are not driven by the predictability of market returns from sentiment.
Conclusion
Beta pricing varies with investor sentiment; the security market line is upward sloping only during pessimistic periods. To explain this phenomenon, we argue that unsophisticated traders will participate by Sibley et al (2013) to capture the business cycle, and repeat the analysis in Panel 5 of Table 11 . Our baseline results continue to hold. strongly in risky equities during optimistic periods, obscuring the positive pricing of covariance risk.
However, in pessimistic periods these traders will stay along the sidelines, therefore prices will be closer to fundamentals.
Several empirical tests lend support to our hypothesis. We find that earnings expectations for high beta stocks are significantly more bullish in optimistic periods. Moreover, using the Frazzini and Lamont's (2008) fund-flow-based measure of noise trading, we show strong inflows of funds into highbeta stocks during optimistic periods, but no variation in flows across and high-and low-beta stocks during pessimistic periods. Lastly, using the probability of informed trading to measure noise trading, we find that noise traders are more active in high beta stocks during optimistic periods. Further confirming results obtain from analyzing the order imbalance for small investors as calculated from intra-day data.
Small investors are net buyers (sellers) of high (low) beta stocks when sentiment is optimistic, but no variation is observed in order imbalance for pessimistic periods.
Although we cannot rule out the possibility that our sentiment measure captures variations in a macroeconomic state variable, and that beta and its pricing covary with this variable, such an explanation should also accord with negative beta pricing during optimistic periods, which is challenging.
Collectively, the evidence presented thus supports the view that overly positive views on high beta stocks obscure the positive beta pricing posited by the CAPM.
These results have important implications for organizations, indicating that CFOs can use the CAPM for capital budgeting decisions in pessimistic periods, but not optimistic ones, assuming such periods can be identified in real time. Thus, for real investments undertaken during periods of optimism, it may be more appropriate to derive valuations from model-free methods, using, for example, comparables, and price multiples such as the P/E ratio. This table reports the time series averages of post-formation betas that are assigned to individual stocks. In June of year t, all NYSE firms are sorted by size (price x shares outstanding) to determine decile breakpoints. Using these breakpoints, we assign all firms in the sample in year t into 10 size portfolios. We further subdivide each size decile into 10 portfolios of pre-ranking betas for individual stocks. These preranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. We set beta breakpoints for each size decile using only NYSE stocks. This procedure yields 100 size-beta portfolios. We obtain the equally-weighted returns of these portfolios from July of year t until June of year t+1. We estimate post-formation betas using the returns of these portfolios and the CRSP valueweighted portfolio as a proxy for the market. Pre-and post-ranking betas in all the tables are calculated as the sum of the slopes in the regression of returns on the current and lagged market return. In this table, the post-formation betas are calculated in a rolling fashion by performing the regression each month using five years of past data, which produces an estimate of beta in each month for each size-beta portfolio. This This table reports characteristics of portfolios sorted on betas. In June of year t, all NYSE firms are sorted into 10 portfolios by pre-ranking betas using NYSE breakpoints. These pre-ranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. Stocks priced less than one dollar in June of year t are deleted. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as follows: B is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock.
Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stocks with negative book values are not used. M is the market value of equity as of December of t-1. ME is the company size (price x shares outstanding) measured at June of year t. Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Total volatility is calculated as follows: Using daily data from CRSP we calculate monthly return standard deviation for each company (requiring a minimum of 10 daily observations). In each June of year t, we calculate the average monthly standard deviation for the preceding six months, including June of year t. We calculate Analyst Disagreement using the IBES summary files as standard deviation of outstanding forecasts (as reported by IBES) divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast in June of year t. The data for Analyst Disagreement start in 1976 when the IBES data become available. We average each characteristic for each portfolio every June of year t, and then report the time series average of these estimates. B) . Post-formation betas (Rolling betas) are calculated using the returns of the size-beta sorted portfolios and the CRSP valueweighted portfolio as a proxy for the market. They are calculated as the sum of the slopes in the regression of returns on the current and lagged market return. Rolling beta is obtained by performing the regression each month using five years of past data. The full sample beta [FF beta -as used by Fama and French (1992) ] is calculated by running one regression only for each size-beta portfolio using the data from the entire sample period. ME is the company size (price x shares outstanding) measured at June of year t. BM is the book-tomarket ratio calculated as follows: B is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stocks with negative book values are not used. M is the market value of equity as of December of t-1. ME is the company size (price x shares outstanding) measured at June of year t. In the Fama-MacBeth regressions these variables are matched with CRSP returns for the months of July of year t to June of year t+1. Ret1 is the return of stock i in month t-1. Ret6 is cumulative return of stock i in the six months prior to month t-1, and Ret12 is the cumulative return from of stock i in the six months prior to month t-7. Our sample covers the period 1966-2010. This table reports the average return of beta-sorted portfolios. In June of year t, all firms are sorted into 10 portfolios by pre-ranking betas using NYSE breakpoints. These pre-ranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. Stocks priced less than one dollar in June of year t are deleted. We obtain value-weighted monthly returns for these portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1, where size is measured at the end of June of year t. We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) , orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. We then average portfolio returns and spreads separately for optimistic and pessimistic months. Our sample covers the period 1966-2010. ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. We use Newey-West correction on the standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Stocks priced less than one dollar in month t-1 are not included in the regressions. In Panel A we average the slopes for our entire sample period. In panels B and C we define each month t as pessimistic or optimistic, respectively, and average the slopes separately for each group. We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. Stocks are assigned into size-beta portfolios in June of year t and remain in that classification for 12 months. Stocks are assigned post formation rolling beta (β) in month t, which are obtained from the regression of size-beta portfolio returns on market returns using five years of data ending in month t-1. ME is the company size (price x shares outstanding) measured at June of year t. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as follows: B is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stocks with negative book values are not used. M is the market value of equity as of December of t-1. These variables are matched with CRSP returns for the months of July of year t to June of year t+1. Ret1 is the return of stock i in month t-1. Ret6 is cumulative return of stock i in the six months prior to month t-1, and Ret12 is the cumulative return from of stock i in the six months prior to month t-7. In Panel A, the average number of companies in each cross sectional regression is 3,037, 2,894 in Panel B, and 3,186 in Panel C. (1)- (8) in Frazzini and Lamont (2008) . The time period for the Flow analysis is 1983 to 2010. In Panel C we report average probability of informed trading PIN, calculated for each firm every June of year t following Brown and and Hillegeist (2007) Hvidkjaer (2006 Hvidkjaer ( , 2008 to match trades to quotes, and to identify small and large investor trades. From the daily small investor SOIB for each company we subtract the market-wide imbalance for small investors on that day. We delete top 1% of daily SOIB observations according to small trader turnover and large trader turnover (buy volume +sell volume)/market value)). In Panel A we average daily SOIB for each company and month, and then report the average monthly SOIB for the 6 month period ending in June of year t. In Panel B we calculate earnings surprises using the seasonal random walk model. We assign a beta classification to each event-firm, and rank all event-firms in a given fiscal period and beta group in 4 standardized unexpected earnings groups (SUE). In panel B we report average SOIB for the days [-1,0] , where 0 is the earnings announcement date, for SUE groups 1 (negative surprise) and 4 (positive surprise). In Panel C (D) we follow the same procedure but the event analyzed is analyst recommendations (analyst earnings forecasts), which we split to upward and downward. In Panel D all revisions that exceed 100% in absolute value are deleted. Tstatistics are calculated by clustering observations on the firm level. In all Panels sentiment is defined as optimistic (pessimistic) if the Baker and Wurgler (2006) annual index is positive (negative) in the same year. In Panels B and C, we define each month t as pessimistic or optimistic, respectively, and average the slopes separately for each group. We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. Stocks are assigned into sizebeta portfolios in June of year t and remain in that classification for 12 months. Stocks are assigned post formation rolling beta (β) in month t, which are obtained from the regression of size-beta portfolio returns on market returns using five years of data ending in month t-1. ME is the company size (price x shares outstanding) measured at June of year t. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as follows: B is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stocks with negative book values are not used. M is the market value of equity as of December of t-1. These variables are matched with CRSP returns for the months of July of year t to June of year t+1. Ret1 is the return of stock i in month t-1. Ret6 is cumulative return of stock i in the 6 months prior to month t-1, and Ret12 is the cumulative return from of stock i in the six months prior to month t-7. We calculate analyst disagreement (Disp) using the IBES summary files. Tables 6 and 7 , respectively), perform principal component analysis, and retain the first principal component as an augmented sentiment index. To define sentiment in month t we average the augmented sentiment index from t-1 to t-7 and define sentiment as optimistic (pessimistic) if this average is positive (negative). Using this index in Panel A we repeat the analysis conducted in Table 4 and, in Panel B the analysis of Table 4 we form beta portfolios across sentiment periods and classify them in groups based on institutional ownership, short ratio and analyst coverage. In panel A we calculate institutional ownership as of June of year t for each stock. We partition our sample in two groups based on institutional ownership (above and below median within each beta portfolio in each June of year t), and run the analysis separately for each group. The data for institutional ownership are from Thomson Reuters on WRDS. The time period for this test is 1981-2010. In Panel B we calculate for each stock monthly short ratio as follows: shares held short/shares outstanding, and then average the short ratio for each company in the 12 months ending in June of year t. We partition our sample in two groups based on short ratio (above and below median within each beta portfolio in each June of year t), and run the analysis separately for each group. The time period for this test is 1974-2010. Short sale data are from Compustat. In Panel C we calculate residual analyst coverage as follows: Each month t we run a cross sectional regression of Log(1+number of analysts)= a + b*log(Market Value) + e, where number of analysts is provided by the IBES summary files and MV is end of previous year end market value. The residual from this regression is our measure of analyst coverage in June of year t. We partition our sample in two groups based on residual analyst coverage (above and below median within each beta portfolio in each June of year t), and run the analysis separately for each group. The time period for this test is 1980-2010. In all Panels we obtain value-weighted monthly returns for these portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1, where size is measured at the end of June of year t. ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. The t-statistic is the average slope divided by its time series standard error. We use Newey-West correction on the standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Stocks priced less than one dollar in month t-1 are not included in the regressions. We augment model 2 from Table 8 with the following variables: Age (the log of the number of years between the first date the firm appears in the CRSP files and month t), EF (external finance defined as change in assets minus change in retained earnings divided by assets), GS (change in net sales divided by prior year sales), PrD (dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for firms with positive earnings (income before extraordinary items+ plus deferred taxes minus preferred dividends, as available) and 0 otherwise), and DivD (dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for firms with positive dividends per share at the ex-date and 0 otherwise. This table reports the average return of beta-sorted portfolios. In June of year t, all firms are sorted into 10 portfolios by pre-ranking betas using NYSE breakpoints. These preranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. Stocks priced less than one dollar in June of year t are deleted. We obtain valueweighted monthly returns for these portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1, where size is measured at the end of June of year t. In Panel A we regress the spread between the high and the low beta portfolio at time t on a constant and the excess market return at time t separately in optimistic and pessimistic sentiment periods. In Panel B we run a Fama-MacBeth cross sectional regression of returns on a constant and beta (defined as in Table 5 ) interacted with market returns and report the time series averages of these parameters. We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) , orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. In both Panels the t-statistics are calculated by correcting for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. This figure depicts the relationships between beta and returns. The x-axis shows portfolio average returns and the yaxis average portfolio beta. To obtain beta portfolios in June of year t, all firms are sorted into 20 portfolios by preranking betas using NYSE breakpoints. These pre-ranking betas are calculated using 24 to 60 monthly returns (as available) ending in June of year t. Stocks priced less than one dollar in June of year t are deleted. We obtain valueweighted monthly returns for these portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1, where size is measured at the end of June of year t. We measure sentiment using the annual index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalized with respect to macroeconomic variables. We define all observations in year t as optimistic (pessimistic) if the sentiment index is positive (negative) in year t-1. We then average portfolio returns separately for optimistic and pessimistic months. The left panel shows the relationship between beta and returns for the entire sample period and the right Panel only in pessimistic sentiment periods.
